B Additional TESS Results

B.A Descriptive Statistics and Baseline Willingness-to-Pay
Column 1 of Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics. All statistics for baseline relative WTP necessarily exclude the Endline-Only group. Liberal is self-reported political ideology, originally on a seven-point scale, normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one, with larger numbers indicating more liberal. Party is self-reported political affiliation, similarly normalized from an original seven-point scale, with larger numbers indicating more strongly Democratic. Environmentalist measures the consumer's answer to the question, "Would you describe yourself as an environmentalist?" Conserve Energy is an indicator for whether the consumer reports having taken steps to conserve energy in the past twelve months. Homeowner is a binary indicator variable for whether the consumer owns his or her home instead of rents. Except for baseline WTP, these variables were recorded when the consumer first entered the TESS panel, not as part of our experiment.
Column 2 presents the difference in means between all Treatment groups vs. Control. Column 3 presents the difference in means between the Positive and Balanced Treatment groups. All 20 t-tests fail to reject equality, as do the joint F-tests of all characteristics. Table A .2 shows the association between baseline WTP and the individual characteristics in Table A .1. Column 1 shows that men, Democrats, and those who report having taken steps to conserve energy have higher demand for CFLs. Columns 2-5 separately test individual variables of environmentalism and political ideology which are correlated, providing additional evidence that liberals tend to have higher WTP. These correlations conform to our priors and build further confidence that the WTP measurements are meaningful.
The table also provides suggestive evidence on two distortions other than imperfect information and inattention which might justify subsidies and standards. The first is that renters might have lower CFL demand because they might leave the CFLs in the house's light sockets when they move and be unable to capitalize on their investment. Lacking random or quasi-random assignment in renter vs. homeowner status, Davis (2012) and Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012) correlate durable good ownership with homeowner status conditional on observables. Columns 1 and 6 replicate their approach in the TESS data, showing that homeowners do not have higher WTP for CFLs. However, additional (unreported) regressions with market share at market prices as the dependent variable show that we cannot reject the Davis (2012) result that homeowners are five percent more likely to prefer CFLs.
The second potential distortion considered in Table A .2 is present bias. In the post-experiment survey, we estimate the β and δ of a quasi-hyperbolic model through a menu of hypothetical intertemporal choices at two different time horizons: $100 now vs. $m 1 in one year, and $100 in one year vs. $m 2 in two years. i at $300 and $40, respectively. The median δ is 5/7, meaning that the median consumer prefers $100 in one year to $130 in two years but prefers $150 in two years to $100 in one year. A slight majority of consumers (52 percent) have β = 1, meaning that they are not present or future biased by this measure, and the median β is also 1.
If there is a distribution of β and δ, consumers with higher β and δ should be more likely to purchase CFLs. Column 1 shows that there is a conditional correlation between δ and baseline WTP, suggesting that people who are more patient may be more likely to purchase CFLs. However, there is no statistically signif-icant correlation between β and WTP. Column 7 repeats the estimates without any conditioning variables, and the coefficients are comparable. The results in column 1 rule out with 90 percent confidence that a one standard deviation increase in β increases WTP for the CFL by more than $0.47.
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B.B Estimating the Equivalent Price Metric in the TESS Experiment
The TESS experiment allows us to directly estimate the conditional average treatment effect on WTP for consumers marginal between points on the multiple price list. Figure 4 shows the 11 intervals over which we calculate CATEs, which are bounded by −∞, −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, ∞. In this section, we calculate EPMs over the same intervals and compare them to the CATEs. We exclude the highest and lowest intervals, because it is not possible to calculate a demand slope on an interval bounded by an infinite price.
To estimate EP M [p l , p h ], we reshape the TESS data so that there are two purchase observations per consumer, one at p l and one at p h . Denoting S p as an indicator for whether this observation is at the lower price, we then estimate the following equation in a linear probability model:
Because there are multiple observations per consumer, we cluster standard errors by consumer.
Coefficients from this regression can be inserted into Equation
Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Table A. 3 presents results for each of the nine relative price intervals. Column 1 gives the numerator of Equation (9), column 2 gives the denominator, and column 3 gives the ratio of columns 1 and 2. Column 4 presents the CATE estimates, which are from Figure 4 . Column 5 presents the p-value of the difference between the EPM and CATE on WTP, while column 6 presents the absolute value of the difference divided by the CATE. In four of the nine price intervals, the EPM and CATE differ with greater than 90 percent confidence, and on average, the two quantities differ by 49 percent.
B.C Self-Monitoring Scale
If demand effects are present, they should differentially affect people who are more able to detect the intent of the study and are more willing to change their choices given the experimenter's intent. One existing measure of these issues is the Self-Monitoring Scale, a battery of personality questions developed by Snyder (1974) . Snyder writes that the scale is designed to identify individuals who "tend to express what they think and feel, rather than mold and tailor their self-presentations and social behavior to fit the situation."
From the set of standard Self-Monitoring Scale statements, we took the most relevant six:
• It's important to me to fit in with the group I'm with.
• My behavior often depends on how I feel others wish me to behave.
• My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.
• My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs.
• Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.
• I would NOT change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else or win their favor.
At the very end of the post-experiment survey, we asked consumers to respond to each of these six statements on a five-point Likert scale from "Agree" to "Disagree." We normalize responses to each question to mean zero, standard deviation one, and interact each with the treatment indicator while also controlling for lowerorder interactions. Table A .5 presents results. While the six Self-Monitoring Scale variables are correlated with each other, none is correlated with endline CFL demand or with the treatment effect, nor is a composite of the six.
B.D Effects on Purchase Priorities
The post-experiment survey also asks consumers to rate on a scale of 1-10 the importance of price, energy use, bulb lifetime, warm-up time, and mercury and disposal in their purchase decisions. Table A .6 presents how the treatments affected these ratings. Both Positive and Balanced treatments decreased the stated importance of purchase prices, consistent with consumers re-orienting away from purchase price as a measure of total cost. Point estimates suggest that both the Positive and Balanced treatments increased the importance of energy use and that the Positive treatment also increased the importance of bulb lifetimes. These are the only estimates in the entire analysis whose significance level is affected by the weighting: they are not significant in Table A .6, but (unreported) regressions show that they are statistically significant when weighting all observations equally. The Positive Treatment group and Control group do not differ on the importance of warm-up time or mercury and disposal, which is to be expected because neither group received information on these two issues. Interestingly, the Balanced treatment decreased the importance of warm-up time. One potential explanation is that consumers had previously believed that CFL warm-up times were longer, and the treatment reduced the importance of this difference between CFLs and incandescents. (3) are calculated by applying the Delta method to Equation (9) using the covariance matrix from estimates of Equation (8). See Appendix B.B for details. Notes: This table presents estimates of Equation (6) with the addition of Self-Monitoring Scale variables and the interaction of these variables with the Treatment indicator. The coefficients presented are these interaction terms. The outcome variable is endline willingness-to-pay for the CFL. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, ***: Statistically significant with 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence, respectively. Observations are weighted for national representativeness. 
Appendix B Tables
C iPad Total Cost Comparison Screen
Notes: This is the information screen presented to Treatment group consumers in the in-store experiment. Numbers in this screen shot represent a consumer buying one CFL at typical purchase prices and national average electricity prices. 
where as before, H is the distribution of perceived valuationsv = v−b, and D B (p) = 1−H(p) is the market demand. The equivalence between (10) and (11) follows from noting that
The expectation E(v|v) is computed with respect to the induced joint distribution over (v,v) . 34 From this it follows that for p = c − s,
Intuitively, the average true value of consumers who change their choices from I to E as a consequence of increasing the subsidy by some very small amount ds is
The social cost of transferring an additional unit of product E to a consumer is c. Thus the social efficiency gain from inducing all marginal consumers to purchase E instead of I is given by 
where as before, H is the CDF of perceived valuationsv.
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Suppose now that D B is locally linear, so that D B (p) ≈ 0. Now as in Harberger (1964), the first term becomesˆs
The second term becomes
Combining the expressions for the first and second terms yields equation (2) .
An additional approximation:
Note that in our TESS experiment, we compute E H [B(x)|p − ∆s ≤ x ≤ p] directly. However, when that is not possible, an additional approximation that may be useful is that if in addition to D being locally linear B is also locally linear on [p − ∆s, p] (i.e., B (x) ≈ 0 on the interval), then
. This second approximation is a second order approximation of W (s + ∆s) − W (s). The initial approximation we derive is slightly more precise than second order, since we do not rely on B (p) ≈ 0. 
By definition,
while to a first order approximation,
It thus follows that when demand curves are linear, the EPM correctly approximates B(p) if and only if
Note, however, that
, and so it is not generally true that the condition in Equation ( 
D.B.2 Conditions for exact equivalence
With a slight abuse of notation, we now let F (·|b) denote the CDF of v conditional on a value of b and we let G(·) denote the unconditional CDF of b. To ease notation and exposition, we will restrict here to the case where F (·|b) and G continuously differentiable, with respective density functions f (·|b) and g. The argument for finite or mixture distributions would follow almost identically.
Proposition 2 For all generic distributions G, EP M (p) = B(p) if and only if
for all b.
The condition in the proof is slightly more general than the condition that f (v|b) is linear on v ∈ [p, p+b]. And the linearity condition, in turn, is roughly equivalent to requiring that D N is linear and that b is independent of v in a neighborhood of v = p + b.
Proof.
db and thus comparing the equations for B and EP M shows that these two equations will hold for all generic density weights g(b) if and only if the condition in the Proposition holds for all b.
D.B.3 Quantifying possible deviations between the equivalent price metric and the average marginal bias
Here we will restrict to a simpler scenario in which we can partition consumers into finitely many types θ such that a consumer with WTPv has a true value ofv + τ θ (v). Clearly, the divergence between B(p) and EP M (p) can only be higher in the slightly more general set up. We now show that even under fairly restrictive regularity conditions, the difference between B(p) and EP M (p) can be quite large.
are all measured, and that the following additional restrictions are known to apply: 
and as low as:
Proposition 3 shows that B(p) and EP M (p) can differ significantly even under the following restrictions: demand curves are linear, treatment effects are uncorrelated with the slopes of the unbiased demand curves D N,θ , and treatment effects are restricted to lie in a reasonably narrow range. A consequence of Proposition 3 is that even when information has no effect on demand, the conditional average treatment effect on WTP can still be substantial. Suppose, for example, that 40 percent of consumers purchase E at baseline prices, that a $1 subsidy move demand by 10 percentage points, that information provision has no effect on demand at subsidized and unsubsidized prices. This roughly corresponds to the estimates in the in-store experiment. Finally, suppose that the treatment effect on any one consumer's WTP cannot be any greater than $5 or smaller than -$5. Proposition 3 then shows that despite there being absolutely no treatment effect on quantity purchased, and despite the very restrictive regularity conditions, the CATE on WTP for consumers who are marginal to the $1 subsidy can still be as high as $2 and as low as -$2.50. This generalizes our normal distributions example in Section II to the case of biases with narrow support and more restrictive distributional assumptions.
It is important to note that Proposition 3 does not compute the maximum possible divergence between B(p) and the EPM. Rather, it only provides a sense of how much the two can diverge. We have not yet been able to compute the maximum possible divergence between these two measures, though we conjecture that the quantities in Proposition 3 do, indeed, correspond to the maximum possible divergence.
D.B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider two types, θ = 1, 2 and let
We consider how large or small we can make the quantity
where equation (16) follows from (15) due to restrictions 1 and 2 in the proposition.
from which it follows that
We now have
The last equation above shows that to maximize B(p) − EP M (p) optimal to have m 1 as high as possible and m 2 as low as possible.
37 So the final step is to determine these bounds for m 1 and m 2 .
To this end, note that we must have
. Additionally, since we are requiring linearity of demand curves in the region of interest, we must have
. Additionally, demand must be downward sloping, which implies that m 2 > −1.
Altogether, we thus want to set
, from which it follows that
The first part of the proposition now follows by combining (17) with the bounds we computed for m 1 and m 2 .
Part 2: Minimizing B(p) − EP M (p) This other part follows analogously. Set τ 1 (p 2 ) = τ 2 (p) = EP M (p 2 ). Then as in (17) we analogously get that
Again, for m 1 > m 2 we similarly want m 1 as high as possible and m 2 as low as possible; that is, we want the low bias types to be the ones who are most elastic.
Analogously to the preceding computations, we must have
. And as before, m 2 > −1 to generate downward-sloping demands.
.
37 Just consider a perturbation where m1 is increased by and m2 is decreased by β/(1 − β)
D.C A more general framework and the comparing demand responses approach
To analyze other strategies for quantifying consumer bias, we now propose a more general framework that will allow us to compare product subsidies to energy taxes. The framework will formally encompass an extension of our energy efficiency model, as well as the salience models of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) and Goldin and Homonoff (2013) . The framework is also applicable to other situations in which there may be opaque attributes, such as the work by Hossain and Morgan (2006) on shipping charges, the work by Abaluck and Gruber (2011) on out-of-pocket insurance costs, and the work by Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor (2013) on left-digit bias. As before, we will continue working with the somewhat simpler setup in which we can partition consumers into finitely many types θ, where each type is a correspondence between true and perceived valuations. True demand curves are given by D N,θ (p), while biased demand curves are given by D B,θ (p)= D N,θ (p + τ θ (t 1 , t 2 )), where p = c+t 1 +t 2 is the total price after taxes t 1 and t 2 . For energy durables applications, t 1 can correspond to product prices while t 2 can correspond to the tax on energy costs. For tax salience applications, t 1 can correspond to the tax included in prices while t 2 can correspond to the tax not included in prices; for this application, if consumers weight t 2 by σ ≤ 1, then τ θ (t 1 , t 2 ) = −(1 − σ)t 2 .
In this more general framework, the welfare impact of increasing t i depends on the marginal bias with respect to t i :
where, ζ
is the portion of consumers who are type θ out of all those consumers who respond to a marginal increase in the tax t i ; and D ti B,θ (t 1, t 2 ) denotes the derivative of D B,θ with respect to t i evaluated at (t 1, t 2 ). Following the derivations in Proposition 1, it easy to show that at p = c + t 1 + t 2 ,
where D ti B is the derivative of D B with respect to t i . When consumers are debiased, changes in t 1 and t 2 should have identical impacts on demand, and thus we let D N (p) denote the derivative of D N with respect to either t 1 or t 2 at p = c + t 1 + t 2 . Analogously to Section 2, we define
D.C.1 The EPM and the average marginal bias in a more general setting
As before, the EPM and the average marginal bias will typically not be the same. Notice also that as long as B 1 = B 2 , it will always be true that the EPM is an imperfect approximation to either B 1 or B 2 (and possibly both). And as we show below, B 1 = B 2 for very simple and natural examples of this framework.
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We now show how the EPM can fail to provide the necessary sufficient statistic even for very simple models of bias, as long as bias is heterogeneous.
First, consider the simple case in which type θ consumers underweight energy costs by θ, and consider their choice of the relatively less efficient appliance I. Suppose that c = c 1 + c 2 , where c 1 is the relative cost of producing the energy using appliance and c 2 is the relative energy cost associated with utilization. Then τ θ (t 1, t 2 ) = −(1 − θ)(c 2 + t 2 ), where t 2 are the additional energy costs due to taxation. In this model, D (t 1 , t 2 ) , and thus EP M = B 2 . To see this concretely, note that to a first order approximation,
whereas
In fact, it is easy to see that as long as θ is heterogeneous, |EP M | > |B 2 | because the most biased types are also the least elastic to the energy tax. 39 Assuming homogenous bias and then using the EPM to calculate a sufficient statistic for the optimal energy tax would thus produce a number that is too high. The implications of the EPM for the tax salience frameworks of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) and Goldin and Homonoff (2013) are identical. To obtain these frameworks, let t 2 be the sales tax not included in price, and let τ θ (t 1, t 2 ) = (1 − θ)t 2 . Then proceed as above for the energy cost salience framework. Again, the conclusion here will be that in the presence of heterogeneity, |EP M | > |B 2 |. Thus assuming a representative agent framework and using the EPM as a sufficient statistic for B 2 would lead one to underestimate the excess burden of increasing t 2 .
D.C.2 The comparing demand responses approach with homogeneous consumer bias
Another common approach for measuring bias is the "comparing demand responses" approach, The idea of this approach is as follows: Suppose consumers underweight future energy costs. Then they should also react less to changes in energy costs than to changes in the upfront prices of energy-using appliances. The approach then is to use the ratio
as a measure of bias. With a homogeneous consumer who underweights energy costs by θ, the comparing elasticity approach is simple. In this model, all consumers are homogeneous and have bias τ (t 1, t 2 ) = −(1 − θ)(c 2 + t 2 ).
. Notice, however, that the success of this derivation depends on the fact that the bias τ θ = −(1−θ)(c 2 +t 2 ) is linear in t 2 and constant in t 1 . More generally,
, a quantity that without a number of additional structural assumptions is not generically related to the representative consumer's level of bias τ . Depending on how τ changes with t 1 or t 2 , the comparing demand responses approach will either over-or 39 Alternative versions of the EPM that place D under-estimate the level of the bias. This is in contrast to the EPM, which always provides an accurate first order approximation when bias is homogenous.
In particular, the comparing demand responses approach does not generate a statistic that can be used to approximate the bias when d dt1 τ is is non-zero and d dt2 τ is not constant, both of which are conditions that are likely in practice. In the context of energy-using durables, d dt2 τ is likely to be non-constant because attention is endogenous and thus θ is increasing in t 2 . And similarly, a higher product tax might make a consumer more likely to consider the alternative seriously. The second reason is that bias is likely to depend on true valuations. Depending on the model of attention, the bias could be increasing or decreasing with the true valuation. Consumers who value the energy efficient product the most, for example, are the most likely to be "Green" consumers who are very attentive to energy costs. But because the true valuation of marginal consumers depends on the price p, this leads the bias to depend on the price p.
D.C.3 The comparing demand responses approach with heterogeneous consumer bias
So far, we've shown that when consumer bias is homogeneous, the success of the comparing demand responses approach depends critically on the elasticity of consumer bias with respect to t 1 and t 2 . This is contrast to the EPM which (under the full debiasing assumption) always provides an accurate first-order approximation to consumer bias. How does the comparing demand responses approach compare to the EPM or B(p) under heterogeneity?
Consider again the simple setting in which consumers underweight energy-related costs by θ, so that τ θ (t 1, t 2 ) = −(1 − θ)(c 2 + t 2 ). Then the comparing demand responses approach gives where the last line is a consequence of (19). Thus to a first order approximation, the comparing demand responses approach allows us to back out the same statistic as the one given to us by the EPM. The analysis in section D.B thus shows that just like the EPM, the comparing demand responses approach can be used to produce a consistent estimate of B 1 , but not of B 2 . However, our TESS experiment suggests that the conditions under which the EPM produces an accurate estimate of B 1 do not hold, which implies that Under these more general conditions, ρ is the ratio of two weighted averages of "bias response" functions 1 + d dti τ θ . Without various special assumptions, this difficult to interpret quantity is not closely related to the EPM, B 1 , or B 2 . Again, d dti τ θ is likely to be a complicated function because of endogenous attention or because bias depends on true valuations.
